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Hunger and Stupidity

I am against any form of aid for Africa because any continent that receives aid for 50+ years and does not change can do without aid. Even humanitarian aid is of no use.  Yet troubling images from East Africa and Somalia are bound to haunt us. These images weigh on the mind of those who are emotionally inclined to think that Africa may survive only through financial aid. These images serve as justifications for mass emotion. No good ever came from mass emotion. A crowd does not think – individuals do.

The African relief fad serves to distract attention from real issues which are accountable government and democracy. There is famine in parts Chad, Darfur and Kordofan (Sudan), Somalia, parts of Uganda and D.R. Congo, Central African Republic etc. These countries are not victims of fate. These countries are victims of centralized autocratic regimes, idiotic agricultural policies and politically engineered civil strife. The dying child in Darfur or the fly-infested mouth in Somalia is man-made by Africans. Starvation is not a problem; it’s a symptom of bad governance.

Since western donors are inclined to give aid to an extremely poor population by procedure (say 0.2% of GDP); when a potentate in Cameroon, Burkina-Faso, Congo, Mauritania, Uganda DRC, Burundi etc. designs an economy based on foreign financial input, the extremely poor population becomes an asset. If he alleviates poverty, he disqualifies himself from western financial dregs. Overnight, the extremely poor become a tool for survival. Crusading against misery is not a priority in dictatorships. Glaring example; while citizens die of cholera in Bafut (NW Region - Cameroon), CPDM party militants of the same region donate 400 million FCFA for the re-election campaign of a president who is in power since 1983 and may not even be a candidate for the upcoming elections. Read my lips.

Image bias is accompanied by ignorant logic of pop stars (Bono, USA for Africa, Live AID) who’ll say “if we take one day off nuclear spending and put it on food, it will make a huge difference”. I’ll prefer the nuclear spending to go on while we forget not to put a juvenile nuke under Sassou, Bongo, Biya, Compaore, Deby, or Bozize. One bang will be more efficient than a whole US Defense budget worth of canned fish.

There is of course a shortage of food among Africans as there is among Indians, Chinese and Bangladeshi. But that does not mean there is a shortage of food in Africa. Even if you make food available for Somalia, there remains the insurmountable problem of distribution logistics. Such logistics are borne of delivered electoral promises, accountability and representative government. There is no African state which respects the above and faces famine, starvation or both. Vices go together: Cholera in Cameroon, Meningitis in Chad, Famine in Somalia and the endless list goes on while Ghana, South Africa, and Botswana have a groove on.

Drought may be a calamity but consequent death from starvation is the result of bad governance. 

Incompetence of State

Of the potential candidates for Cameroon’s 2011 Presidential elections, one is illegal. Amending Article 6(2) of 1996 Constitution in April 2008 could have put Paul Biya’s presidential hopes in constitutional limbo. The issue was first hinted at by Alain Didier Olinga(1) in April. We have pondered on the issue and talked to constitutional experts with the condition of anonymity and these are their arguments.

1 – Paul Biya was sworn in as president of Cameroon in 1997 under the 18 January 1996 constitution that limited presidential mandates to two. Article 6(2) of 1996 Constitutional amendment expressly states that limitation of presidential mandates is not retroactive. As such, when Paul Biya promulgated the reform into law in January 1996, the provision did not apply to him as he was active president. It could only apply to a president who is sworn into office with this limitation in force. Therefore, as of 1997 when Biya was sworn in again his presidential mandates were limited to two.

Eleven years later in 2008, a move initiated by CPDM dominated parliament culminated in a constitutional amendment that removed limitation of consecutive presidential mandates. Unlike in 1996, the new wording omitted retroactivity. If the new provision is not retroactive, then it cannot be applicable to Paul Biya who is active president since 1997.

2 – CPDM militants claim April 14^th 2008 constitutional amendments did not aim at giving Paul Biya limitless presidential mandates. Constitutionally, they got it right. The wording of the new provision on consecutive presidential mandates does not say the law is retroactive.

3 – According to Article 2 of Cameroon Civil code, the law is not retroactive except in situations where the law itself invokes retroactivity.

Biya’s Options.

With the parliamentary obesity that CPDM enjoys in National Assembly, the majority party may yet do another modification aimed at completing April 2008 reform by making the provision of limitless presidential mandates retroactive. The National Assemble may yet present an interpretative law, to clarify its intention when the law was revised in April 2008.

Now “the People’s Call” becomes very interesting. Is it a call for a popular revolt? We throw the question to your appreciation; can president Biya alter the nature of his second presidential mandate while it is still running?

(1)  Alain Didier Olinga was dismissed from the post of Deputy Director of IRIC in 2008 for non-conformist opinions on constitutional reform. 

WHAT IF?

What if Biya were not president of Cameroon  in 2012? Not by losing elections but because he chooses not to run for office in 2011. For the first time since 1992 President Biya, although the statutory presidential candidate for CPDM (since he is party leader) is yet to announce his candidacy for October 2011 elections. At first this may look normal till you realize that the usual suspects on the opposition bench are also delaying presidential campaign kick-off. Could they be privy to “hidden” information? Or maybe they want to identify whom they are running against in the CPDM.

What if by modifying constitutional limitation of presidential mandates in 2008, Biya actually pulled the limelight on himself so that he could foist a power transition with a candidate of his choice under the radar?

What if recent political options adopted by Biya are geared at protecting his candidate. Take the case for “Operation Epervier”. The move to fight against corruption by intimidation and public disgrace, overflows with political strategy. The question has never been whether the accused and arrested are guilty or not, but whether they have political ambition. When corruption is erected as a form of control, all those who flirt with the system leave open a flank through which they can be brought down. The kind of corruption that grips Cameroon is not moral but systemic. There exists no means of working in a corrupt regime yet claim not to be corrupt. If we agree, that Mebara, Abah Abah, Siyam Siewe, Etondo Ekotto, Fornjindam, Nguini Effa, Michel Fotso etc may be corrupt to an extent, yet do have vested political ambitions, then we need to examine whether their ambitions threaten Biya. Obviously, Biya is not threatened by them in any way. Even popularity ceased to be a threat for Biya in 1992. The ease with which president Biya rounds these men off to jail is proof. If they don’t threaten Biya, then they threaten someone else. In which case, the political victims of “Operation Epervier” threaten whomever Biya wants to choose as replacement?  Biya may be clearing hurdles for his candidate.

What if Biya’s renewd acquaintance with Fru Ndi is not coincidental? Although they have met six times in as many months, Biya has politically neutralized Fru Ndi. Worse still he makes the SDF Chairman look like a village chief who rules, but has no power. What is the political opportunity of meeting Fru Ndi regularly? Fru Ndi may yet be a thorn to the side of Biya’s candidate. In which case, befriending Fru Ndi also follows the same logic of facilitating the path for someone else.

What if Biya voiced this intention not to be president beyond 2011 to at least one person. If this information leaks (it’s often so in Cameroon) then there is a clear justification for the circus-like “The People’s Call”. For the first time, choosing a CPDM presidential candidate seems to need popular adherence rather internal party regulation. Biya’s problem is “being president”, at all cost. Even with 39% of 4 million registered voters in 1992. Biya has not changed. He will settle for 15% percent of the vote on condition that rival parties have 14% and less. Where does the idea that citizens within and out of the CPDM want Biya to be candidate? “The People’s Call” is evocative of orphaned children looking for a lost parent in a war zone.

What if Biya’s choice is Rene Sadi, Marafa, Laurent Esso, Ahmadou Ali, Cavaye, Ayang Luc, Mebe Ngo etc.? They all meet the criterion that makes me think Mebara, Abah Abah, Siyam Siewe, Etondo Ekotto, Fornjindam, Nguini Effa, Michel Fotso, Ondo Ndong and the rest are potential rivals. Biya could even choose a non-CPDM stalwart, reinforcing the idea why he needs to silence all opposition from within his party.

What if this election were postponed in 2011? With the present state of affairs, it is plausible. 

March 15th

Title: Biya Shed's Liability

A soldier without political education is a potential criminal - Thomas Sankara 1985

 In a presidential decree reorganizing Cameroon’s Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief, Paul Biya retired four generals and promoted ten others to varying posts of responsibility. This is the culmination of military reforms announced by President Biya in 2001. The four slated for retirement are Generals Pierre Semengue 76yrs, Oumaroudjam Yaya 73yrs, Nganso Sunji 75yrs  and Tataw James 78yrs.

 Keen observers of Cameroon’s military may not be surprised that Biya retires James Tataw (legally blind) and Pierre Semengue (suffering from a partial stroke). Actually, these presidential decrees attempt to mask a huge malaise within Cameroon’s Armed Forces.

 Cameroon’s army is beset by one main shortcoming, tribalism. Outright tribalism dates to aborted coup attempt in 1984 when President Biya reverted to surround himself and appoint to strategic security posts only military staff from his region of origin or others whose destinies were accidentally or fatally linked to his own in 1984 like Brigadier General Desancio Yenwo Ivo. In recent police appointments, the present police boss Martin Mbarga Nguele was Police boss in April 1984.

In the same vein, advancements are either guaranteed by tribal origin or familiarity to those with the “right” origins. This system seemed to attain its objectives till 1990. Beyond that year, President Biya, realizing his political survival depends on repression rather than electoral promise, decided to swell the ranks of Cameroon’s army and police as a rampart to potential street protests. Crash courses turned former gang leaders and a few honest Cameroonians into scantily trained and inadequately equipped military and policemen. Meanwhile within army ranks, many respected and well trained officers (Captain Galabe, Colonel Fomundam etc.) were either put to retirement or never got advancement because their origins predisposed them to be sympathetic to certain political opinions.

 

The direct consequence of poor training and barbaric nepotism is the high casualty rate in Bakassi, (and all other theatres of armed conflict involving Cameroon’s army) indiscipline and a generalized drop in the quality of services and professions offered by Cameroon’s Armed Forces and Police. Gone are the days when “Genie Militaire” performed road construction (Melen to Mvog-Betsi, Carrefour Vogt to Ecole des Postes, MINEDUC roundabout, or the road from Council to Mile 8 Mankon in Bamenda). Instead, welcome to street thuggery in Limbe, Bamenda, Douala and Yaoundé courtesy of BIR (Battallion d’Intervention Rapide).

The underlying confusion in genre and casting is revealed in president Biya’s March 11 decrees. The new naval Chief of Staff is General Jean Mendoua a sharp-shooter from the Presidential Guard. The Army Chief of Staff is General Ngoua Ngally a marine officer from the Navy. General Mahamat Ahmed, a paratrooper from Koutaba was made General and appointed head of Fire Brigade. The reasons are evident; in the absence of quality training, no particular specialty is required for the different corps of Cameroon’s Defence Forces.

Missed Opportunities

“A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason…” Cicero 58BC

32 years ago the Iranian revolution scored a massive success. The Shah was exiled, the military was decimated and Islamist fundamentalism occupied the ensuing void. Few may agree, but in many ways, the Iranian revolution was the first successful people revolution of the 20^th Century. Contemporary analysis of the Iranian Revolution is clouded by what or who replaced the Shah, but true to form and substance, there is a straight line running from Iran, through Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. What made these revolutions work?

Ingredients

On the political level, is an unpopular oligarchy run by an elite who believe or make-believe that power change will cause a civil war. The only form of power change they envisage is by death of the potentate or monarchic handover. Such regimes are propped up by western democracies as a means to stabilize the price of energy resources or to curb the never-proven rise of Islamic extremism. Contrary to common opinion these regimes have very weak and divided armies. The reason being the massive dependence on elite forces at the expense of the national army. In Libya the army defects to the streets because they play second fiddle to Kaddafi’s elite unit. That same situation plays out between BIR and Army in Cameroon. Demographically, these states have massive youthful disenfranchised populations (up to 70% between the ages of 18 and 40). Add generalized unemployment to this mix and it represents up 49million in Egypt, 7million in Tunisia, 4million in Libya and 14million in Cameroon. The ingredients are right, the cooks are ready but the fire must go under the pot for the meal to be served.

Cart before the Horse

The most difficult thing to find is a pretext. The difficulty does not rise from lack of opportunity but from the ability to recognize a spontaneous pretext and reaction time between that recognition and the mass motion needed to kick start a revolt. In Iran it was the death by fire of 400 people at a theatre in Abadan as it was with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia.

Last week, some strike attempts were witnessed in Cameroon. While they proved mettle of Kah Wallah and a handful against a mechanized repressive police, it did little to tickle the appreciation of the most optimistic closet revolutionary. Laudable efforts don’t always guarantee satisfactory results. The political agenda overshadowed revulsion for Biya et al.

This week, a ready-made pretext shows up. True to form, it is spontaneous. Nobody, except the Minister of Finance, could predict or warn against the looming bankruptcy of the fastest growing micro-finance institution in Cameroon; Cofinest (Compagnie Financiere de l’Estuaire). The social extent of this development can be gauged from the 850,000 savings accounts run by Cofinest. On the street level, this translates to 85, ooo people per region in Cameroon. Beyond the numbers, Cofinest touches the soul of Cameroon - football. Originally, Cofinest was a common initiative group created by supporters of Union Douala. From 1996 it became a micro-finance institution with 508 shareholders and up to 850,000 accounts by December 2010.

There is a huge difference between political analysis, agendas and street survival. When a political agenda precedes a revolt, it is called a coup d’etat. For a revolution to take root, political agendas may only recuperate rather than lead a people’s power revolution.

A Tale Of Two Cities

How may we not be impressed by news from Cairo? Why should we not share the joy of millions of Egyptians of all social classes and of all faiths who with bare hands and just eighteen days deposed a dictator who seemed immovable, invincible and so sure of himself he was preparing a dynastic succession? This second revolution-in-a-month, evicts authoritarian and corrupt regimes in power for three decades, under the pampered protection of Western powers for their role as a bulwark against the radical Islam?

Tunisia took everyone by surprise, but experts warned against Domino Theory, stressing that Tunisia is a geopolitical lightweight, and that Egypt is another level. Same causes have produced the same effects, and the largest Arab country, one that has always set the tone has fallen even faster than Tunisia.

These revolutions are unlike any other. There is no charismatic leader, no secret organization, no secret army or political organization; but groups on Facebook, Tweeter, videos on YouTube, and the idealism of youth who aspire to live differently. Social networks did not "make" the revolution, they simply permitted a generation to invent a virtual space of freedom that has never stopped wanting to get into the real world. The spirit existed, the heroes were available, until Mohamed Bouazizi, a young vegetable seller gave the pretext that triggered an involuntary movement of historic proportions.

Two questions arise after such sudden regime collapse. What happens once the tyrant leaves? What will happen in other similar countries? No autocratic regime in Africa is immune to the shock events of Tunis and Cairo.

Transition
In Tunisia and Egypt, a difficult transition is launched. In one case as in the other, the protesters do not want the survival of the dictator’s cronies or the dictator's regime without the dictator. They do not want to see "their" revolution confiscated by the army or the Islamists. But the first real burning question is: who's next? This question is in the mind of all autocrats. Facebook chatter says: Algeria on Saturday, Bahrain on the 14th, Morocco on the 20th February ... And beyond the Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, Cameroon, Libya?

Each event will not cause a revolution: Bahrain is not Egypt, Morocco is not Syria and Cameroon is not Libya. But these countries are not immune to the cocktail that caused the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt: long-serving autocrats, failed economies, impoverishment, a thirst for freedom, a rejection of nepotism, corruption, censorship and generalized stupidity.

A universal message
There remains the huge geopolitical impact of these events. It takes the West by surprise, and paralyses Israel who has everything to gain by maintaining the status quo. These events shook all dictatorships, all authoritarian regimes, regardless of their latitude and culture, beyond the Arab world and Islam. The West may just realize that, rather than propping these regimes as a bulwark to radical Islam, such regimes are actually breed for radicalization.