According to Russian forensic experts Yasser Arafat died of natural causes not radiation poisoning.

They are the latest to give an opinion on the former Palestinian leader’s death in 2004.

The Russian announcement is more strategic than scientific. It's obvious that one cannot ascertain after 8 years without reasonable doubt if Arafat was poisoned with polonium or not. Yet, Putin's government cannot afford any extra distraction before Sotchi Games. WHY? Because 85% of rogue Polonium sales are traceable to Russia and 15% to other former Russian Republics.

Francophone Conundrum.

I watched 2 live TV debates on Sunday May 19^th on 2 private TV stations airing from Cameroon: Canal 2 International and Spectrum TV (STV2). On both shows, the topic was national unity and obviously "The Anglophone Problem" crept in. Previously, I found it very difficult to articulate "that problem" satisfactorily. However, I definitely made up my mind after the shows.

Why would the Anglophone Problem come up in a show which focused national unity? Do anglophones threaten national unity? You may debate on the WHY and HOW of the unification and reunification; of who was re-unifying with whom and why; of whether it was a unification or re-unification or even if the event ever took place. Regardless, so long as ONE Cameroonian is labeled "Anglophone" (for whatever reason), you must entertain the possibility that there may be a specific problem which only Anglophones face owing to the history, sociology, ancestry and/or territory. Curiously, on both shows, inasmuch as they both labeled some Cameroonians "Anglophone", the TV stations didn't find it relevant to invite an Anglophone! Surreal as it may seem, this is a reflection of contemporary Cameroon. Suddenly I realized that, maybe the Anglophone Problem is actually a "francophone issue". How do you acknowledge a problem facing some people, yet fail to recognize the people? One reason only; disrespect.

The Anglophone Problem concerns anglophones but it doesn't automatically follow that anglophones have a problem. I don’t think so. “The Anglophone Problem” is the francophone incapacity to distinguish between unification and uniformity. Anglophones didn’t become francophone in 1972 nor do Anglophones  expect francophones to become anglophone any day. We are whom we are.

North Korea has no Nukes!

Recent weeks have played out the strangest display of foolhardiness, blackmail and plain crazy. A supposed nuclear power, North Korea, threatening to blow up the United States and South Korea.

The case for a North Korean nuclear ICBM lacks proof. It goes against all convention. Normally, ICBM capability is "discovered" or communicated, not advertised. Some may argue whether Israel has nuclear capability. Or South Africa or Iran or Pakistan. North Korea is the only country that every advertised its nuclear capability. 

If the past is any indication to go by, North Korean threats of war are overblown. However, the chances that it will conduct another nuclear test are high. And it is gaining ground in its missile program, experts say, though still a long way from seriously threatening the U.S. mainland. "It's not the first time they've made a similar threat of war," said Ryoo Kihl-jae, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. "What's more serious than the probability of an attack on South Korea is that of a nuclear test. I see very slim chances of North Korea following through with its threat of war."

Consider these facts about nuclear weapons. No nuclear power has ever before threatened another nuclear power with a direct attack. 

My Take
In a very revealing interview by Bill Clinton after he left the White House, the former US President explained how the US purchased North Korean military stockpiles and destroyed them for fear of these weapons (including handguns and grenades) getting into the international black-market. This option practiced by Clinton Presidency was driven by the crudeness of the weapons rather than their tactical impact.

The North Korean nuclear program is the best weapon against itself.

1. It permanently drains their meagre ressources 
2. It guarantees that North Korea is dependent on food aid from its designated enemies (South Korea and USA).
3. It maintains hyper inflation, massive poverty and a permanent brain-drain with North Korean scientists defecting to South Korea. 

Will the US intervene.
No! Similar to WWII where British intelligence concluded that assassinating Hitler will be counter-productive because his generals (Heinz Guderian, Wilhelm Keitel, Erwin Rommel and Gerd von Rundstedt) freed from the overburdening yoke of an erratic civilian dictator could effectively win the war between 1939 and 1942; a US intervention will destabilize North Korea and may create a military vacuum that may forge the emergence of a real military threat to South Korea and beyond. It serves US military interests to keep a twenty-something year old (who is yet to make the difference between video games and war) at the helm.

Predictable Outcomes

 I love some, despise some or live in total indifference to others. My opinions are forged from factual analyses and are completely devoid of emotion or belief.

1. The opinions i hold on individuals will not change when they die (if they die before i do). When I despise you, I really do. Take Chavez's case. I have no respect whatsoever, for any regime or Head of State who modifies the constitution that brought him to power and uses the new one to stay in power. If you don't finish your mission during the required term, YOU FAILED! So don't expect my sympathy for Chavez ... death is not a form of power change.
2. I love Coup d'Etats ... on one condition. That the perpetrator of a coup accept that he is in violation of public code of conduct and he has no right to judge anybody else who plans or executes a coup against him.
3. I am suspicious of all regimes when they go beyond a 2nd Term. 
4. Being irrelevant in politics means you have no solutions for the problems you identified. John Fru Ndi, Julius Malema and Paul Biya are first on my list.
5. I condone the death sentence if it's carried out in public. A sanitised execution is a sign of cowardice.
6. I hold no religious views whatsoever. I respect individuals who believe in God (s) but completely despise their beliefs. 
7. I'm completely indifferent to the Hippopotamus because if you kill all of them, nothing will change.

BOKO "HAREM"

Don't apply any logic tested elsewhere on Cameroon. Cameroon is a dysfunctional state. Study these facts closely. If a family is hijacked "using motorbikes", the 1st doubt you want to clear is how 7 ppl get transported on bikes. One bike is fast, many bikes riding in a convoy with children is a bit of a hassle. Next, the source of that info should be arrested. The amount of detail in the info betrays proximity. Normally kidnap victims "disappear" till further notice. They were kidnapped and taken to Nigeria in a zone where borders are neither marked nor secured means the person giving the information either masters map reading, is using a GPS or has a GSM device with Geo-location capabilities. My take? The french family was kidnapped by Cameroonian thugs and sold to bigger thugs who think the name BOKO HARAM makes the fickle-hearted shudder

Known Knowns

There is no unknown
We know only as much as we can prove.

TB Joshua Opinion Survey

I wish to know what you think about TB Joshua ... vote on the right PLEASE.

Hunger and Stupidity

I am against any form of aid for Africa because any continent that receives aid for 50+ years and does not change can do without aid. Even humanitarian aid is of no use.  Yet troubling images from East Africa and Somalia are bound to haunt us. These images weigh on the mind of those who are emotionally inclined to think that Africa may survive only through financial aid. These images serve as justifications for mass emotion. No good ever came from mass emotion. A crowd does not think – individuals do.

The African relief fad serves to distract attention from real issues which are accountable government and democracy. There is famine in parts Chad, Darfur and Kordofan (Sudan), Somalia, parts of Uganda and D.R. Congo, Central African Republic etc. These countries are not victims of fate. These countries are victims of centralized autocratic regimes, idiotic agricultural policies and politically engineered civil strife. The dying child in Darfur or the fly-infested mouth in Somalia is man-made by Africans. Starvation is not a problem; it’s a symptom of bad governance.

Since western donors are inclined to give aid to an extremely poor population by procedure (say 0.2% of GDP); when a potentate in Cameroon, Burkina-Faso, Congo, Mauritania, Uganda DRC, Burundi etc. designs an economy based on foreign financial input, the extremely poor population becomes an asset. If he alleviates poverty, he disqualifies himself from western financial dregs. Overnight, the extremely poor become a tool for survival. Crusading against misery is not a priority in dictatorships. Glaring example; while citizens die of cholera in Bafut (NW Region - Cameroon), CPDM party militants of the same region donate 400 million FCFA for the re-election campaign of a president who is in power since 1983 and may not even be a candidate for the upcoming elections. Read my lips.

Image bias is accompanied by ignorant logic of pop stars (Bono, USA for Africa, Live AID) who’ll say “if we take one day off nuclear spending and put it on food, it will make a huge difference”. I’ll prefer the nuclear spending to go on while we forget not to put a juvenile nuke under Sassou, Bongo, Biya, Compaore, Deby, or Bozize. One bang will be more efficient than a whole US Defense budget worth of canned fish.

There is of course a shortage of food among Africans as there is among Indians, Chinese and Bangladeshi. But that does not mean there is a shortage of food in Africa. Even if you make food available for Somalia, there remains the insurmountable problem of distribution logistics. Such logistics are borne of delivered electoral promises, accountability and representative government. There is no African state which respects the above and faces famine, starvation or both. Vices go together: Cholera in Cameroon, Meningitis in Chad, Famine in Somalia and the endless list goes on while Ghana, South Africa, and Botswana have a groove on.

Drought may be a calamity but consequent death from starvation is the result of bad governance. 

Incompetence of State

Of the potential candidates for Cameroon’s 2011 Presidential elections, one is illegal. Amending Article 6(2) of 1996 Constitution in April 2008 could have put Paul Biya’s presidential hopes in constitutional limbo. The issue was first hinted at by Alain Didier Olinga(1) in April. We have pondered on the issue and talked to constitutional experts with the condition of anonymity and these are their arguments.

1 – Paul Biya was sworn in as president of Cameroon in 1997 under the 18 January 1996 constitution that limited presidential mandates to two. Article 6(2) of 1996 Constitutional amendment expressly states that limitation of presidential mandates is not retroactive. As such, when Paul Biya promulgated the reform into law in January 1996, the provision did not apply to him as he was active president. It could only apply to a president who is sworn into office with this limitation in force. Therefore, as of 1997 when Biya was sworn in again his presidential mandates were limited to two.

Eleven years later in 2008, a move initiated by CPDM dominated parliament culminated in a constitutional amendment that removed limitation of consecutive presidential mandates. Unlike in 1996, the new wording omitted retroactivity. If the new provision is not retroactive, then it cannot be applicable to Paul Biya who is active president since 1997.

2 – CPDM militants claim April 14^th 2008 constitutional amendments did not aim at giving Paul Biya limitless presidential mandates. Constitutionally, they got it right. The wording of the new provision on consecutive presidential mandates does not say the law is retroactive.

3 – According to Article 2 of Cameroon Civil code, the law is not retroactive except in situations where the law itself invokes retroactivity.

Biya’s Options.

With the parliamentary obesity that CPDM enjoys in National Assembly, the majority party may yet do another modification aimed at completing April 2008 reform by making the provision of limitless presidential mandates retroactive. The National Assemble may yet present an interpretative law, to clarify its intention when the law was revised in April 2008.

Now “the People’s Call” becomes very interesting. Is it a call for a popular revolt? We throw the question to your appreciation; can president Biya alter the nature of his second presidential mandate while it is still running?

(1)  Alain Didier Olinga was dismissed from the post of Deputy Director of IRIC in 2008 for non-conformist opinions on constitutional reform. 

WHAT IF?

What if Biya were not president of Cameroon  in 2012? Not by losing elections but because he chooses not to run for office in 2011. For the first time since 1992 President Biya, although the statutory presidential candidate for CPDM (since he is party leader) is yet to announce his candidacy for October 2011 elections. At first this may look normal till you realize that the usual suspects on the opposition bench are also delaying presidential campaign kick-off. Could they be privy to “hidden” information? Or maybe they want to identify whom they are running against in the CPDM.

What if by modifying constitutional limitation of presidential mandates in 2008, Biya actually pulled the limelight on himself so that he could foist a power transition with a candidate of his choice under the radar?

What if recent political options adopted by Biya are geared at protecting his candidate. Take the case for “Operation Epervier”. The move to fight against corruption by intimidation and public disgrace, overflows with political strategy. The question has never been whether the accused and arrested are guilty or not, but whether they have political ambition. When corruption is erected as a form of control, all those who flirt with the system leave open a flank through which they can be brought down. The kind of corruption that grips Cameroon is not moral but systemic. There exists no means of working in a corrupt regime yet claim not to be corrupt. If we agree, that Mebara, Abah Abah, Siyam Siewe, Etondo Ekotto, Fornjindam, Nguini Effa, Michel Fotso etc may be corrupt to an extent, yet do have vested political ambitions, then we need to examine whether their ambitions threaten Biya. Obviously, Biya is not threatened by them in any way. Even popularity ceased to be a threat for Biya in 1992. The ease with which president Biya rounds these men off to jail is proof. If they don’t threaten Biya, then they threaten someone else. In which case, the political victims of “Operation Epervier” threaten whomever Biya wants to choose as replacement?  Biya may be clearing hurdles for his candidate.

What if Biya’s renewd acquaintance with Fru Ndi is not coincidental? Although they have met six times in as many months, Biya has politically neutralized Fru Ndi. Worse still he makes the SDF Chairman look like a village chief who rules, but has no power. What is the political opportunity of meeting Fru Ndi regularly? Fru Ndi may yet be a thorn to the side of Biya’s candidate. In which case, befriending Fru Ndi also follows the same logic of facilitating the path for someone else.

What if Biya voiced this intention not to be president beyond 2011 to at least one person. If this information leaks (it’s often so in Cameroon) then there is a clear justification for the circus-like “The People’s Call”. For the first time, choosing a CPDM presidential candidate seems to need popular adherence rather internal party regulation. Biya’s problem is “being president”, at all cost. Even with 39% of 4 million registered voters in 1992. Biya has not changed. He will settle for 15% percent of the vote on condition that rival parties have 14% and less. Where does the idea that citizens within and out of the CPDM want Biya to be candidate? “The People’s Call” is evocative of orphaned children looking for a lost parent in a war zone.

What if Biya’s choice is Rene Sadi, Marafa, Laurent Esso, Ahmadou Ali, Cavaye, Ayang Luc, Mebe Ngo etc.? They all meet the criterion that makes me think Mebara, Abah Abah, Siyam Siewe, Etondo Ekotto, Fornjindam, Nguini Effa, Michel Fotso, Ondo Ndong and the rest are potential rivals. Biya could even choose a non-CPDM stalwart, reinforcing the idea why he needs to silence all opposition from within his party.

What if this election were postponed in 2011? With the present state of affairs, it is plausible. 

March 15th

Title: Biya Shed's Liability

A soldier without political education is a potential criminal - Thomas Sankara 1985

 In a presidential decree reorganizing Cameroon’s Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief, Paul Biya retired four generals and promoted ten others to varying posts of responsibility. This is the culmination of military reforms announced by President Biya in 2001. The four slated for retirement are Generals Pierre Semengue 76yrs, Oumaroudjam Yaya 73yrs, Nganso Sunji 75yrs  and Tataw James 78yrs.

 Keen observers of Cameroon’s military may not be surprised that Biya retires James Tataw (legally blind) and Pierre Semengue (suffering from a partial stroke). Actually, these presidential decrees attempt to mask a huge malaise within Cameroon’s Armed Forces.

 Cameroon’s army is beset by one main shortcoming, tribalism. Outright tribalism dates to aborted coup attempt in 1984 when President Biya reverted to surround himself and appoint to strategic security posts only military staff from his region of origin or others whose destinies were accidentally or fatally linked to his own in 1984 like Brigadier General Desancio Yenwo Ivo. In recent police appointments, the present police boss Martin Mbarga Nguele was Police boss in April 1984.

In the same vein, advancements are either guaranteed by tribal origin or familiarity to those with the “right” origins. This system seemed to attain its objectives till 1990. Beyond that year, President Biya, realizing his political survival depends on repression rather than electoral promise, decided to swell the ranks of Cameroon’s army and police as a rampart to potential street protests. Crash courses turned former gang leaders and a few honest Cameroonians into scantily trained and inadequately equipped military and policemen. Meanwhile within army ranks, many respected and well trained officers (Captain Galabe, Colonel Fomundam etc.) were either put to retirement or never got advancement because their origins predisposed them to be sympathetic to certain political opinions.

 

The direct consequence of poor training and barbaric nepotism is the high casualty rate in Bakassi, (and all other theatres of armed conflict involving Cameroon’s army) indiscipline and a generalized drop in the quality of services and professions offered by Cameroon’s Armed Forces and Police. Gone are the days when “Genie Militaire” performed road construction (Melen to Mvog-Betsi, Carrefour Vogt to Ecole des Postes, MINEDUC roundabout, or the road from Council to Mile 8 Mankon in Bamenda). Instead, welcome to street thuggery in Limbe, Bamenda, Douala and Yaoundé courtesy of BIR (Battallion d’Intervention Rapide).

The underlying confusion in genre and casting is revealed in president Biya’s March 11 decrees. The new naval Chief of Staff is General Jean Mendoua a sharp-shooter from the Presidential Guard. The Army Chief of Staff is General Ngoua Ngally a marine officer from the Navy. General Mahamat Ahmed, a paratrooper from Koutaba was made General and appointed head of Fire Brigade. The reasons are evident; in the absence of quality training, no particular specialty is required for the different corps of Cameroon’s Defence Forces.

Missed Opportunities

“A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason…” Cicero 58BC

32 years ago the Iranian revolution scored a massive success. The Shah was exiled, the military was decimated and Islamist fundamentalism occupied the ensuing void. Few may agree, but in many ways, the Iranian revolution was the first successful people revolution of the 20^th Century. Contemporary analysis of the Iranian Revolution is clouded by what or who replaced the Shah, but true to form and substance, there is a straight line running from Iran, through Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. What made these revolutions work?

Ingredients

On the political level, is an unpopular oligarchy run by an elite who believe or make-believe that power change will cause a civil war. The only form of power change they envisage is by death of the potentate or monarchic handover. Such regimes are propped up by western democracies as a means to stabilize the price of energy resources or to curb the never-proven rise of Islamic extremism. Contrary to common opinion these regimes have very weak and divided armies. The reason being the massive dependence on elite forces at the expense of the national army. In Libya the army defects to the streets because they play second fiddle to Kaddafi’s elite unit. That same situation plays out between BIR and Army in Cameroon. Demographically, these states have massive youthful disenfranchised populations (up to 70% between the ages of 18 and 40). Add generalized unemployment to this mix and it represents up 49million in Egypt, 7million in Tunisia, 4million in Libya and 14million in Cameroon. The ingredients are right, the cooks are ready but the fire must go under the pot for the meal to be served.

Cart before the Horse

The most difficult thing to find is a pretext. The difficulty does not rise from lack of opportunity but from the ability to recognize a spontaneous pretext and reaction time between that recognition and the mass motion needed to kick start a revolt. In Iran it was the death by fire of 400 people at a theatre in Abadan as it was with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia.

Last week, some strike attempts were witnessed in Cameroon. While they proved mettle of Kah Wallah and a handful against a mechanized repressive police, it did little to tickle the appreciation of the most optimistic closet revolutionary. Laudable efforts don’t always guarantee satisfactory results. The political agenda overshadowed revulsion for Biya et al.

This week, a ready-made pretext shows up. True to form, it is spontaneous. Nobody, except the Minister of Finance, could predict or warn against the looming bankruptcy of the fastest growing micro-finance institution in Cameroon; Cofinest (Compagnie Financiere de l’Estuaire). The social extent of this development can be gauged from the 850,000 savings accounts run by Cofinest. On the street level, this translates to 85, ooo people per region in Cameroon. Beyond the numbers, Cofinest touches the soul of Cameroon - football. Originally, Cofinest was a common initiative group created by supporters of Union Douala. From 1996 it became a micro-finance institution with 508 shareholders and up to 850,000 accounts by December 2010.

There is a huge difference between political analysis, agendas and street survival. When a political agenda precedes a revolt, it is called a coup d’etat. For a revolution to take root, political agendas may only recuperate rather than lead a people’s power revolution.

A Tale Of Two Cities

How may we not be impressed by news from Cairo? Why should we not share the joy of millions of Egyptians of all social classes and of all faiths who with bare hands and just eighteen days deposed a dictator who seemed immovable, invincible and so sure of himself he was preparing a dynastic succession? This second revolution-in-a-month, evicts authoritarian and corrupt regimes in power for three decades, under the pampered protection of Western powers for their role as a bulwark against the radical Islam?

Tunisia took everyone by surprise, but experts warned against Domino Theory, stressing that Tunisia is a geopolitical lightweight, and that Egypt is another level. Same causes have produced the same effects, and the largest Arab country, one that has always set the tone has fallen even faster than Tunisia.

These revolutions are unlike any other. There is no charismatic leader, no secret organization, no secret army or political organization; but groups on Facebook, Tweeter, videos on YouTube, and the idealism of youth who aspire to live differently. Social networks did not "make" the revolution, they simply permitted a generation to invent a virtual space of freedom that has never stopped wanting to get into the real world. The spirit existed, the heroes were available, until Mohamed Bouazizi, a young vegetable seller gave the pretext that triggered an involuntary movement of historic proportions.

Two questions arise after such sudden regime collapse. What happens once the tyrant leaves? What will happen in other similar countries? No autocratic regime in Africa is immune to the shock events of Tunis and Cairo.

Transition
In Tunisia and Egypt, a difficult transition is launched. In one case as in the other, the protesters do not want the survival of the dictator’s cronies or the dictator's regime without the dictator. They do not want to see "their" revolution confiscated by the army or the Islamists. But the first real burning question is: who's next? This question is in the mind of all autocrats. Facebook chatter says: Algeria on Saturday, Bahrain on the 14th, Morocco on the 20th February ... And beyond the Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, Cameroon, Libya?

Each event will not cause a revolution: Bahrain is not Egypt, Morocco is not Syria and Cameroon is not Libya. But these countries are not immune to the cocktail that caused the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt: long-serving autocrats, failed economies, impoverishment, a thirst for freedom, a rejection of nepotism, corruption, censorship and generalized stupidity.

A universal message
There remains the huge geopolitical impact of these events. It takes the West by surprise, and paralyses Israel who has everything to gain by maintaining the status quo. These events shook all dictatorships, all authoritarian regimes, regardless of their latitude and culture, beyond the Arab world and Islam. The West may just realize that, rather than propping these regimes as a bulwark to radical Islam, such regimes are actually breed for radicalization.

Perception soothes … Reality is Rotten.

“…where corruption abounds, laws must be very numerous”. (Tacitus – Rome AD56-AD117)

The latest report from Transparency International (TI) breezed through Cameroon with the obvious criminal silence that is characteristic of the guilty. Highly ranked at 9.3 on 10, are Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore. Cameroon ranks 146 on 178 alongside Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Nepal, Paraguay and Yemen with a score of 2.2 on 10. As a rule-of-thumb in Cameroon, such reports are spun by apparatchiks to demonstrate external conspiracies to destabilize Cameroon. They prove a point unintentionally! Institutionally unreliable and structurally weak states do get easily manipulated by external reports. What is TI’s methodology and which countries rank alongside Cameroon? 

Scope: The World Bank describes corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. As such attracting foreign investment requires perceptions of a healthy business environment, and information on levels of corruption influences the willingness of donors to assist or relate overtly with developing countries. First published in 1995, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has gained prominence over the years as a leading indicator on institutional corruption. Through these years, Cameroon’s consistency is apparent at the bottom ranks. This grim picture contrasts recent spectacular arrests of potentially corrupt public sector officials in Cameroon. Evidently these arrests have a reverse effect on Cameroon’s CPI rating. Rather than pulling Cameroon up the rankings, they stay low because these selective arrests prove that corruption in Cameroon  affects even the means to fight corruption. Perception finally caught up with reality. 

Limitations: The CPI is a cumulative indicator that ranks countries on the degree to which corruption is perceived among public officials and politicians. TI defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” and relies on thirteen resident and non-resident surveys from ten independent organizations. A minimum of three sources must be available for a country to be included in the CPI. Variations in the number of sources used for each country certainly occur. For example, while Singapore’s 2010 CPI rating was based on nine sources, only three were available for Iraq. The final source averages, score each country. Calling the report a perception index, betrays the difficulty in quantifying corruption absolutely. The major difficulty may stem from a non-universally agreed definition for corruption. Where is the line drawn between lobbying and bribery? 

TI defines corruption as “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Is this definition reasonable for a kleptocratic bureaucracy whose elite confiscate power by fraud, intimidation and tailor-made constitutions? “Abuse of entrusted power” does not therefore exist where power was never entrusted! Does this mean authoritarian regimes are not corrupt? Rather, it would be plausible to suggest that all the activities of ruling elites are corrupt, since their primary motivation is to hold on to power for private gain at all cost. Regardless, there exist striking similarities between Cameroon and the countries scoring 2.2 on CPI 2010:

• Heavy reliance on external financial aid,
• General disregard for human rights,
• A diplomacy that neither has determinants nor objectives,
• Constantly changing constitutions,
• A youthful but largely unemployed population,
• And an increasingly ageing and isolated ruling elite.

Yemen for example is convulsing with Islamic extremism; Haiti completely depends on emergency aid relief and witchcraft; Cote d’Ivoire is yet to recover from an identity crisis that sparked a civil war. Iran is trapped between technological blackmail and religious bigotry, while Libya is yet to differentiate between the state and the Gaddaffi clan. Nepal just emerged from regicidal carnage to parliamentary democracy won by Maoists in 2008 although Mao or Maoism never tolerates more than one party. Among these country’s rulers, President Ali Abdullah Saleh is president of North Yemen since 1978 and unified Yemen since 1990. Muammar Gaddaffi, Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution, presides Libya since 1969 while Paul Biya remote controls Cameroon  since 1982. The resulting picture is a group of institutionally weak states who maintain these same low ratings on HDI (Human Development Index) and MDG (Millennium Development Goals). 

Reality: Paul Biya’s increasingly long absences from Cameroon prove that he neither has the intention nor is he capable of fighting corruption effectively, because it is a tool he uses to control a cohort of c0-opted accomplices. This explains why “Operation Epervier” is carried out “with direct instructions from the Head of State”! The judiciary and the police end up playing stage-managed roles in a tragedy that will go down with a loud bang. 

“…clearing the mess should never be entrusted to the one who created the mess…” (Anonymous – Indian Traditional)

 

 

 

Battle Lines

Power alternation in Cameroon among presidential hopefuls ignores a crucial observation. Incumbency should be applicable to the opposition as it is to the party in power because since 1997, the actors and consequent results are the same. If absolute power corrupts absolutely, then absolute powerlessness surely renders imbecile.

 All political parties are good enough! There is no difference between UPC, UNDP, CDU, CPDM or SDF, but there is a huge difference between the people whose ideas and objectives dominate these parties. No ethical criterion exists to qualify the CPDM or the SDF as good or bad. Morality is not a political exercise. Parties are made of men, who promote dreams and nightmares. These men may be extremely bad and are found everywhere. Backtrack to Nuremberg Trials (1945): the Nazi Party was never put on trial. Individuals, albeit all Nazi, where tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Their similarity was not Nazi allegiance, but crimes carried out in the exercise of the functions in a Nazi state. Individual responsibility does not dissolve in the aggregate. The individual has moral and ethical obligations that the party may not have. The individual must be defined! Legally, you can neither protect nor confront what you cannot define.

In Cameroon there is no distinction between the party and the individual. Basically, the individual is not defined. Failure to define the individual in a potentially frenzied environment gives room for all forms of abuse and misconceptions about power. Beyond goat-herding slogans like “Great Ambitions” and “Power to the people”, what do political parties in Cameroon stand for? What does John Fru Ndi offer? Non-voter registration? A boycott? John Fru Ndi definitely wants to be the next president of Cameroon, but he has never planned to be one. Absence to recognize what an individual stands for explains why the SDF develops epileptic seizures because Kah Walla has a firm opinion about issues, especially voter registration. Voting is the ultimate political activity and eventually “those who are too smart to engage in politics are punished by being governed by those who are dumber” (Plato, Athens 427 BC - 347 BC)

Paul Biya won the last presidential election by just over 2million votes. This means state machinery, sovereign institutions, a faulty electoral system and pre-determined malfunctions were put into contribution for an output of just over 20% of the electorate or 10% of the total population. The CPDM is not a formidable beast after all! Paul Biya counts on silence. That choice may be explained by the incapacity to misquote silence. His cohorts and opponents invest huge amounts of mental energy trying to second-guess him at the expense of building an effective electorate.

If you bellowed “SDF!” in 1991, the response was “power to the people”. By the turn of the century, the response was “power”. Presently there is no response since there is no rally call.  From “power to the people” to “power”: was that a simple contraction, or a psychological overhaul from the quest of a group, to an individual’s quest?

Power is essentially speculative. We think we are powerful because we compare ourselves to adversaries, potential and actual. Confrontation on the other hand is empirical and absolute. Only through confrontation can power be realized. Cameroon is on a collision-course to a generational confrontation whose victims are obvious. Challenging with novel ideas, plausible goals, verifiable solutions and an average age of 45years are Dr. Matthias Eric Owona Nguini, Kah Walla, Joshua Osih, Prof. Pius Ottou, Charles Ateba Eyene, Dr. Fomunyoh and Hilaire Kamgang. On the incumbent bench are Paul Biya and  Augustin Koddock (born at beginning of WW2 - 1933), John Fru Ndi and Adamou Ndam Njoya (born in 1941 and 1942 respectively), Bello Bouba (born in 1947) and cronies with an average age of 70years. These are the battle lines for 2011. A whole generation may not be sacrified for the personal comforts of a gerontocracy.

As in chess game, a threat is more formidable than its realization. The messages from the younger generation herald the first shot in this epic battle. Where do you stand?

John Fru Dilema

Charisma is a temporal political asset serving a strategy which in itself is temporal. Riding on the crest of political gains acquired between 1992 and 1997, the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F.) and its Chairman have clearly never evaluated the scope of gains made in the mid 90’s nor really identified how the S.D.F. achieved those gains. If not, why does the S.D.F. not encourage Cameroonians to participate in voter registration when the party’s clout depends on massive voter registration in the mid 90’s ? I identify two reasons which reveal the mindset of John Fru Ndi.

Firstly, incompetence. Fru Ndi is yet to adopt nor is capable of understanding the internal dynamics of a democratic party. Failure in politics is a sign of ageing. Absolute failure is a clarion for change. Politically, we do not fail because we have aged; but we age and become irredeemably “old” because we fail. This translates as the politicians’ inability to propose novel ideas and solutions, or when he becomes the raison d'être for reform. President Abdoulaye Wade, though aged 81 is “younger” than Thabo Mbeki (16yrs younger) because the latter could not propose solutions to South Africa’s problems. In Cameroon, disagreeing with Paul Biya is no longer enough! You need to propose actionable solutions. Fru Ndi is Chairman and Presidential candidate of the S.D.F. since 1990. He has never won an election in which he is a candidate. Statistically, it is the highest failure rate: 100%. Therefore, along with the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement(C.P.D.M.) and an incompetent Supreme Court, Fru Ndi shares the responsibility for Cameroon being subjected to the Biya regime till date. 

Secondly, Fru Ndi has no notion that equal opportunity is the underlying principle in democracy. Dictators are made of same stuff. A dictator often thinks his god-given mandate excludes all other contemporaries from decision-making. “Me or nobody” is the familiar statement. Fru Ndi and cronies think only he may be presidential candidate. As such they create ideal conditions for the exclusion of S.D.F. sympathizers from the voting process. If Fru Ndi genuinely believes there can be another candidate (apart from himself), he will have no problem encouraging S.D.F. sympathizers to register and vote. A bad strategy is better than no strategy at all. Fru Ndi must take a stand about voter registration. Nonetheless, Fru Ndi will maintain ambiguity between not calling a boycott and not calling for voter registration till it is too late to choose any. Thereafter, he’ll fake “democratic re-awakening” by losing to another candidate at S.D.F. primaries. But the candidate will campaign in vain, since there may be no S.D.F. sympathizers registered to vote.

Like Yasser Arafat in his last days, Fru Ndi clings to a potential charisma which serves only his personal political survival. Arafat never attempted to stop Hamas firing rockets into Israel from Palestinian controlled territories for two reasons: had he done so, and Hamas refused to oblige it would have proven he lacks complete control over Gaza. On the other hand, if he did, and Hamas complied, then Arafat assumes responsibility for Kassam rockets targeting Israeli frontline settlements. The political survivor confuses his destiny with that of the people he leads. Fru Ndi realizing that he lacks the mettle to dislodge Biya regime, has resorted to ultimate survival tactics. If S.D.F. sympathizers register and vote, he’ll still lose, so he prefers blaming the score on non-voter registration.

This situation raises a question that plagues African multiparty politics in general. What is the profile of a potential head of state? A bigot? An egotist? An illiterate incompetent? A monolingual demagogue? An Industrialist? An enlightened despot? No rule applies across-the-board. But there is a huge difference between putting oneself at the service of politics, and putting politics at the service of oneself. Fru Ndi fails both ways. He cannot win and his time is up!

Hammas and Sickles

There is always a threshold of tolerance to pain before a people with a common cause (despite differing means) decide to put temporal survival before pre-conceived ideals. The Palestinian people are reaching that point.

The Russians reached that point in 1991, when they decided to follow through with Boris Yeltsin and topple Communism despite his complete lack of tact and democratic tradition. Some Germans reached this point in 1944 when followed Claus Von Stauffenberg in his attempt to eliminate Hitler. South Africans, post 1991 forgot the past and embraced Mandela's peace-offer despite the fresh and bleeding wounds of Apartheid.

For four decades, the Palestinians accepted that their future be dependent on, and thus confused with the personal destiny of Yasser Arafat. Arafat's death produced nothing more than rivalry between his lieutenants and PLO factions. I'll never stop repeating that Palestinians do not realise the land they vowed to get in 1948 is getting smaller. And Hammas...?

Hammas was elected for sure! But Hammas' refusal to declare a ceasefire with Israel, or at least stop rockets from falling in Israel is a manifestation of one fundamental problem in Palestinian politics. There are two kinds of politicians in Palestinian territories. Those who have the prestige and those who have the streets. We know where Hammas stands. Hammas' inability to declare a ceasfire stems from the fact that she does not control those who send rockets into Israel. As such, declaring a ceasefire and still see rockets flying to Israel will expose Hammas as a "not so crucial" factor in the Palestinian equation. In fact, Hammas prefers not to declare that ceasefire so she may still virtually control that perception of mass-violence over Israel. The question is how much longer this will last? How much pain can Palestinians endure in the name of an ideal that makes them start from scratch every other time the Israeli tanks roll in. Or do we really want to accept that a new page in human psychology is being written in Gaza and the West Bank? A whole society has become suicidal? Not true. Mahmoud Abbas is part of that society ... and he doesn't throw bombs at his enemy. Like to say, a Hammers without Sickles are just carpenter's tools.

EU/ African Union Summit

The AU's presence in Lisbon is summarized to a Mugabe debate. Although worse dictators abound in Africa, i support every action against any dictatorship. One dictator less is always better.

What is the AU's mission in Portugal? Is it a level playing-field summit? Are African Leaders summoned to Lisbon? Is the African Union capable of inviting the EU to Africa. Do you imagine Sarkozy, Merkel, Brown, Prodi etc. converging on Lesotho.?

Over 40 years after most African countries where transformed from colonies to decolonised territories in the guise of political independence, Africa is yet to disengage from the choke-hold of a hitherto colonised elite, who's basic education created the "Colonial Auxiliary".

The EU will be present in Lisbon as political and economic block with a constitution, a continental parliament, a strong currency and supra-national rights and responsibilities. Europeans participate in referandii to decide on Euro-wide legislation.

The African Union on the other hand is a loose syndicate of Heads of state, most of whom prefer to be in power for life. Imagine a cocktail of homicidal theorists like Kabila, Compaore and Obiang Nguema. Sprinkle a handful of political dinosaurs like Mugabe, Moubarak... Stir with colonial auxilliaries like Biya, Bongo, Bouteflika, Ben Ali, Sassou and Museveni(altogether they have been in power for 200 years) The resultant fecal outcome, thanks to Kadaffi's erratic impetus, is a more sorry sight than what a Picasso painting appears to a purist. In this bleakness Mbeki, Sirleaf, Toumani Toure, Kouffor et al. are an endangered minority. Africa is represented at the EU/AU Summit by corrupt despots.